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With the number of U.K. citizens aged 75+ doubling to 10 million by 2040, and with 1.3 million
people already receiving social care services in England alone, social care funding is a key public
policy challenge. The government has launched a set of reforms designed to get social care
funding onto a sustainable footing by establishing a new level for what individuals and the state
will pay. The reforms are designed to encourage individuals to explore how best to use their
available wealth and assets to meet care costs through a mixed system of local authority and
private sector care-funding options. One option is to use the value in the home to bridge the cost
between out-of-pocket costs and care home fees. In this article, we consider two new ﬁnancial
arrangements designed to meet the needs of people in different ﬁnancial circumstances based on
releasing equity from the home. These are an equity-backed insurance product and an “equity
bank” that lets a person draw down an income from their home.
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Introduction
Owing to increasing longevity, the number of U.K. citizens aged 75+ will double to
10 million by 2040 with the result that the demand for social care will increase signiﬁcantly.1
If extra longevity is spent more in bad health than in good, then the consumption of social
care per person will also increase.2Unlike health care, an individual is expected to pay for his
or her own social care in the U.K., although some support is available to those least able to
pay. If long-term care is required in a nursing home, a typical pension income would not
cover the fees, in which case, some will be forced to sell their homes or defer payment until
after death.
* This paper draws on two previous research publications: Mayhew and O’Leary (2014) and Mayhew and Smith
(2014a).
1 Karlsson et al. (2006a, b); Forder (2007); Karlsson et al. (2007); Wittenberg et al. (2008a, b); Mayhew et al.
(2010); Appleby (2013).
2 For discussions of this point, see Mayhew et al. (2010) and Jagger et al. (2007).
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The problem of how to pay for care is not conﬁned to the U.K., but is a major policy issue
throughout the developed world.3 The level of support individuals can expect from the state vs
the amount individuals should contribute themselves has therefore become a key issue in a
debate spanning many years.4 In the U.K., some important decisions have already been taken,
including the passing of the Care Act in 2014, which placed new duties on municipalities
(i.e. local authorities) including an assessment of an adult’s need for care and support.
Following on the recommendations of the Dilnot Commission, a key element of the
legislation is to put a cap or limit on out-of-pocket care costs.5 After due consideration, the
government decided to set the cap at £72,000 (equivalent roughly to 2–3 years in a care
home), after which the state would pay. The cap only applies to the care element of care
bills and not to accommodation costs, which individuals will continue to pay for out of
pocket. This means that many could face bills estimated at well over £140k before they
reach the cap,6 which is way beyond the reach of most people. Administration of the cap
itself is complex, which is why the date of introduction of the cap has recently been put
back from 2016 to 2020.7
Although not everybody will need to pay for care in their lifetime and therefore have bills
of this magnitude, it remains a signiﬁcant risk for individuals and their families. It is
estimated, for example, that around 30 per cent will need long-term care at some point in
their lives and, of these, 16 per cent will reach the cap.8 We also know that a typical pension
income will not be sufﬁcient to pay care home fees without state support so that most people
will struggle to ﬁnd just a fraction of the costs, even if they draw down all their savings. The
problem is that people are reluctant to set money aside for care, some falsely believing that
their care as well as medical needs will be met free of charge by the National Health Service
(NHS); even if they did save, it is unlikely that they would accrue the sums required.
Most older people in the U.K. own their own homes, and so, using their value to help pay
for care is one potential solution if it is planned correctly.9,10 The most common way of
releasing equity is through downsizing to a smaller home (usually at around retirement age)
with the money released being used to fund lifestyle changes and to enhance retirement
income. The costs of doing so can be expensive because of tax11 and moving costs, and
therefore, it is not always a proﬁtable or practical option (e.g. if the original home is of low
value). One option, for example, is to downsize into bespoke retirement villages that provide
3 For example, see Comas-Herrera et al. (2006); Karlsson et al. (2007); Pickard et al. (2007); Costa-Font et al.
(2008); Colombo et al. (2011).
4 Royal Commission on Long Term Care (1999); Wanless et al. (2006); Colombo et al. (2011); Kings Fund
(2014).
5 Commission on Funding of Care and Support (2011).
6 Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2015).
7 Originally the cap was to be introduced from April 2016, but its introduction is now being deferred until 2020
following an announcement by the minister responsible on 17 July 2015, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/446309/Cap_on_care_acc.pdf
8 Department of Health (2013a, b).
9 Mayhew et al. (2010); Just Retirement (2012); Mayhew and Smith (2014b).
10 House of Lords (2013).
11 Stamp Duty Land Tax is payable on the purchase of a property valued at over £125k. The amounts are 2
per cent on the portion of the purchase price up to £250k, and 5 per cent on the portion up to £675k. Rates
increase to 12 per cent on the most expensive properties
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facilities, including care services, that may be needed at a later stage of life, but such options
tend to be available only for the better-off.
The other way to release equity and also to remain in the home is known as equity release.
Under this arrangement, a regular income or a loan is backed by the property as security and
is repayable on death or sale of the home. The cost of a loan depends on interest rates, the age
at which a policy is purchased and on longevity (i.e. loan duration); however, not all the
equity has to be taken in one go, and there is ﬂexibility as to how loans are repaid, which can
signiﬁcantly reduce lifetime costs if coupled with good ﬁnancial planning and advice. If the
debts accrue such that they are worth more than the home when it is sold, the industry body
for equity release operates a policy of “no negative equity” so that there are no debts to the
estate in these cases.
There are essentially two types of equity release: lifetime mortgages and home
reversion plans. Lifetime mortgages involve taking out a type of mortgage that may
be paid as income or in lump sums in which interest is compounded over time.12 The
customer retains ownership of the house, and the loan is repaid when they die or move
into long-term care. With home reversion, providers purchase all or part of a customer’s
home, either through a lump sum payment or through regular payments. Customers
remain in the home, rent-free, with a lifetime lease on any unowned portion of the equity.
At the end of the plan, the property is sold, and the sale proceeds are shared according to
ownership proportions.13
The equity-release industry has moved on from the time in the 1980s when negative
perceptions about equity release were commonplace.14 However, it is fair to say that the
market is nowhere near as big as it could be with only around 20,000 new policies sold a
year, although this is changing with an upsurge in demand since 2013 and new entrants into
the market. The vast majority are for lifetime mortgages in which most use the funds to pay
off debts, increase incomes or improve lifestyles. Hardly any loans are used to pay for care.
Consumer research today cites many reasons for relatively low take-up including the
complexity of the policy, the lifetime costs and the need for sound ﬁnancial advice before
embarking on this course.15 To put a scale on the potential for equity release, the estimated
value of U.K. residential property owned by the population aged 65+ is estimated to be worth
around £1.4tn or £122,000 per person on average (source: ELSA).16 In this article we argue
the case for opening up the market by using equity release in new ways to meet care costs or
provide a relatively cheap form of income support in old age that do not involve the forced
sale of the home.
The next section illustrates how house prices have changed relative to the cost of living,
which supports our case for new products. The subsequent section, which forms the core of
the article, discusses two new types of product: one is an equity-for-insurance product in
which the premium is paid after death rather than from current income on the sale of the
home; the second is a cheap form of equity release designed to produce a regular income
12 See Equity Release Council (2014a).
13 See Equity Release Council (2014b).
14 Terry and Gibson (2012).
15 The Future of the U.K. Equity Release Market: Consumer Insights and Stakeholder Perspectives, L. Overton
and L. Fox O’Mahoney, www.repository.essex.ac.uk/14012/, accessed 25 February 2016.
16 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), www.ifs.org.uk/ELSA, accessed 12 February 2014.
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and to pay for care while living in their own home, which is guaranteed by the state. The
penultimate section discusses the wider knock-on effects of our ideas on the tax and welfare
system in the U.K., and the ﬁnal section concludes. The article is supported by two technical
annexes setting out how such products work from an actuarial standpoint.
House prices vs cost of living
The argument for equity release is usually justiﬁed on the basis of the upward increase in
house prices over the past 25 years. Although house prices are affected by local variations in
supply and demand, most homeowners reaching retirement who purchased their homes
before 2000 will have accumulated substantial windfalls. As Figure 1 shows, house price
inﬂation has outstripped the Retail Prices Index (RPI) since 1985, such that those ﬁnancially
beneﬁting the most are those that purchased before this time. If the home purchaser was aged
25 to 40 at the time, they would be between 60 and 75 years by 2020, by which time most
will have paid off their mortgages.
The same graph also shows that house prices have consistently outstripped earnings after
1998, making house purchase much more problematic, especially for younger buyers. The
signiﬁcance of this point is that it would seem grossly unfair to ask younger generations to
pay extra taxes just so the state can pay for social care for people with much greater wealth.
On paper at least, older people who bought their homes when prices were lower relative to
earnings are considered “rich”, but are sitting on what is effectively “dormant” capital that
cannot be spent, although it might be possible for them to derive a rental income.
In many cases people will be income “poor” because their pension is small or their partner
is deceased and they have no other income to draw on. Releasing some of this housing
capital to boost income or pay for care needs arguably becomes a strategic imperative unless
the state unexpectedly changes its mind about where ﬁnancial responsibility lies. The need
may arise to protect some of the assets against the possibility that they will run down all their
assets because of the high cost of care, especially in nursing homes, where fees can be well
over £1,000 a week. In a domiciliary setting, care costs tend to be more affordable unless
care is needed on a 24-h basis. For bequest or other reasons, selling some equity in the home
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Figure 1. The change in earnings, house prices and retail prices since 1970 (1980= 100).
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to pay for care insurance (generally known as “long-term care insurance”) may therefore be
one attractive option.
Table 1 shows how average house prices and estimated annual average care home costs
have changed over time. Of signiﬁcance is the ﬁnding that in 1980 the annual multiple of
house prices vs care costs was 3.8 but, by 2010, this had risen to 10. It cannot be said for
certain that this multiple will continue to grow, although the rising population of the U.K.
and acute housing shortages suggest that it will persist for the foreseeable future. On the basis
of what we know now, there is hence a one-off window of opportunity for homeowners that
have gained most from house prices, which in theory could last for 30 years or more for this
house-buying generation.
How many could beneﬁt from releasing equity to pay for care? If we take the cohorts
aged 50+, then, as Figure 2(a) shows, less than 20 per cent would be able to afford to pay
for care more than 12 months out of pocket, even if savings are included. This is because
pension income is relatively low compared with care costs and because savings would be
insufﬁcient to ﬁll the gap. Figure 2(b), in contrast, shows that, if the value of the home is
included, it would notionally extend the average homeowner’s ability to pay for care for more
than ﬁve years.
Clearly, this has the capability of transforming the ﬁnancial landscape as long as there was
greater ﬂexibility to tap into this wealth, and the products available were both suitable and
affordable. This example assumes a direct relationship between care payments and equity in
the home and is not necessarily the best way to use equity, especially if individuals wish to
protect their assets or to live in their own home for as long as possible. It therefore seems
strange that not much has already been achieved in using housing equity for this purpose,
and several reasons have been put forward.
It could be argued that rational individuals would take steps to protect their assets or
put money aside to pay for future care. Clearly this is easier to say with the beneﬁt of
hindsight. Most people cannot afford to do so and would rather spend their money on
current consumption. People therefore wait until the point of need, that is, they are forced
into care by their circumstances. “Immediate needs” annuities are designed to deal
with this problem, assuming they have sufﬁcient funds. These pay a guaranteed income
covering the cost-of-care fees in exchange for a one-off lump sum payment at the
point of need. The home is unprotected because it forces the house sale if savings
are insufﬁcient.
Table 1 Change in average house prices vs changes in care costs and the multiple thereof
Year
Average house
price (A) (£)
Estimated average annual
cost of care (B) (£)
Multiple
(A/B) (£)
1980 26,885 7,106 3.8
1985 38,657 10,056 3.8
1990 77,151 13,405 5.8
1995 74,201 15,849 4.7
2000 118,847 18,102 6.6
2005 203,736 20,406 10.0
2010 235,251 23,763 9.9
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Studies have identiﬁed various behavioural reasons why action is not taken sooner:2
● information gaps (not knowing the costs of care and understanding personal liability for
them);
● inertia (half of all people have given no thought as to how they will pay for care, have any
idea how much care costs or how the social care system works);
● incentives (people have an optimism bias and would rather spend their retirement income
on pleasurable things and so risk running down their assets by not taking steps to protect
them);
● moral hazard from means-testing (the belief that the state will pay some or all the costs).
One hoped-for effect of introducing the care cap is that it would enable and encourage
people to plan ahead. In theory, the insurance industry would offer long-term care insurance
on better terms, leading to the supply of more affordable products, although there is still little
evidence of this occurring. The affordability of the premiums is a particular issue, as the cap
only covers care costs and not accommodation costs; so the actual outlay for a place in a
care home is much greater as was previously noted. Not only this, the market for pre-funded
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6+
Years of care afforded from income
%
 o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 a
g
e
 5
0
+
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6+
Years of care afforded from personal wealth
%
 o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 a
g
e
 5
0
+
a
b
Figure 2. Years of affordable care: (a) Ability to afford long-term care costs out of income and savings;
(b) Ability to afford long-term care costs if value of home is included.
Les Mayhew et al.
Using Housing Wealth to Pay for Care Costs
135
long-term care insurance has lapsed, as premiums are very expensive cutting signiﬁcantly
into disposable income. Even with the promise of a cap there are no signs of it reviving.
What are the consequences if nothing changes? The most obvious will be a growing
funding gap in the social care system between what the state pays and the resources needed
to sustain the care system. Unfortunately, it is not easy, for example, to import solutions
adopted in countries such as Germany, Sweden or Japan, which face similar problems.
As Karlsson et al.17 have shown, this could lead to signiﬁcant tax rises, the burden of which
would fall largely on younger generations, who themselves are struggling to come to terms
with high housing costs. As homeownership is the main way of accumulating wealth in the
U.K., the issue becomes one of making it easier to turn this wealth into cash.
New ﬁnancial arrangements for using equity in the home
In this section we describe two new products built on equity-release principles. These are
designed to enable people to plan ahead using housing wealth to cover care costs, whether in
whole or part. In principle they go some way towards addressing the behavioural issues
identiﬁed above, but we fully accept that their introduction would require a considerable
amount of work, including support from both industry and government.
The products are:
● an insurance-based product in exchange for a percentage of the home with premium paid
after death;
● deriving an annuity or income with debt repaid on death to help pay for daily necessities
and for help around the home including basic domiciliary care costs, with the state as
regulator.
The ﬁrst product deals with the problem of high premiums paid for out of pension income,
which individuals would rather spend on more pleasurable things. It is designed for
individuals who cannot afford long-term care insurance premiums but want peace of mind.
The second product is designed to enhance income at a time when income may have
declined because of the death of a partner or because their pension is insufﬁcient to meet care
needs. Its effect should enable people to live more comfortably and for longer in their own
home.
Which product an individual chooses would be up to them but, basically, the insurance
product would normally be considered at an earlier stage in life, say, between ages 60 and 70,
whereas the second product would not normally be needed until later in life (below we
suggest age 75 and argue the reasons for this).
Equity for insurance
In greater detail, equity for insurance works by trading a percentage of housing equity for
insurance cover up to the level of cover required (e.g. this could be to cover care costs up to
the cap or to pay for all care fees including accommodation costs). As with all insurance pro-
ducts, the purchaser loses out if care is never needed, but they are fully protected otherwise.
17 Karlsson et al. (2007).
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Payment of the premium is retrospective and occurs on sale of the home, either on entry into
a care home or after death.
Under this proposal, the premium is linked to the difference between expected care
inﬂation and appreciation in value of home. The mechanism would be for people to ring-
fence part of the equity in their homes, without having to sell or leave their home, in return
for the provider covering all the individual’s future care costs to the levels of cover agreed.
The calculation of the premium expressed as a percentage of the equity in the home is given
in technical Appendix A.
As with traditional equity-release products, the product would be “portable”, allowing
people to move house, subject to an updated agreement being drawn up with the provider,
ring-fencing a percentage of equity in the consumer’s new home. A key advantage is that
consumers who were previously unwilling to make sacriﬁces to their current standard of
living in order to insure against paying for care costs would now have a different option.
Such a deal would need built-in safeguards, protecting both consumers and providers from
dramatic swings in house prices. Protection would guard against the risk of house prices
rising so fast that products would become hugely more expensive compared with the risk
they were insuring against.
Customer guarantees could include an arrangement such that the provider could not
recoup more than a ﬁxed proportion of the care costs. There could be corresponding
protection for providers against dramatic falls in house prices, that is, the product would be
prevented from becoming too expensive as well as too cheap. There might be a need for
limits on the age by which such a policy could be purchased to avoid the possibility of
adverse selection, for example, purchasing a policy knowing that it will be triggered within a
relatively short period and so on.
Other factors could inﬂuence costs of this product, especially anything likely to delay the
provider from recouping the premium. For example, if an individual dies without needing
care and their house is empty, the premium could be recouped fairly quickly or it could
be sold on entering care. However, if there is a surviving dependant who remains in the
home thus preventing its sale, the cost of the premium will be higher, although insurance
agreements could be drawn up to deal with such contingencies.
Table 2 shows how much such a product would be likely to cost expressed in terms of the
percentage of equity released. Columns show the predicted differences between future house
price inﬂation and retail prices and rows the age of the purchaser. This example is based
on care costs of £12k per annum and an average length of two years of stay in a care home.
Table 2 The percentage of housing equity in payment for an equity-for-insurance product based on age
and differences between house price and retail price inﬂation based on a home valued at £200,000
(assumes home valued at £200,000) (see Appendix A)
Age -1% -0.50% 0% 0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3%
50 4.7 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2
55 4.6 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.4
60 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
65 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
70 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2
75 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.4
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The inclusion of accommodation costs would increase the cost two or more fold, but some of
this would normally be payable from disposable pension income and so can be considered
optional. Other assumptions used in this example are that it is based on an assumed current
home value of £200k and allows for a 30 per cent probability of needing care at some point in
the future.
As can be seen, the results show that the wider the gap between house prices and inﬂation,
the smaller the percentage of equity required. Highest percentages of equity are required
when retail prices rise above house price inﬂation as might be expected, but it is also
interesting that the percentages required are relatively invariant with respect to age, on the
basis of this example. Just as with conventional equity-release products, should the equity
released fail to cover the premium after the property is sold, the risk would be borne by the
insurer and not by the estate of the individual.
Deriving an income from the value of the home—the “equity bank”
The second product is not designed to protect assets in the same way as the ﬁrst. Known as
the “equity bank”, it is based on the idea of using the home as a low-cost method to boost
income (for technical details see Appendix B). We know that there is a huge market for care
services aimed at people who are not at the point where they need to go into a care home, but,
because of their low income, they struggle to pay for home maintenance or basic care.
Mayhew18 found that, given their greater availability, there would be wider economic
beneﬁts including a reduction in emergency admissions to hospital.
As homeowners, most would not pass the asset means-test which would qualify them for
state support from their local council. Such situations arise fairly often and may be triggered
by the death of a partner resulting in a sudden drop in income or coupled with rising care
needs. Left unattended, their homes may fall into disrepair with domestic chores mounting
up because help is unaffordable. This negative spiral continues, leading to neglect also
affecting their health and well-being.
It is important that users of the equity bank have conﬁdence in the arrangements and
that charges will be proportionate and fair and the source is trustworthy. The scheme could
be operated by regulated providers with the state acting as guarantor, as it does with
occupational pensions. It differs from the insurance-based product in that it is designed to
produce an income at an earlier stage in the care cycle, that is, before transfer to a care home.
The money homeowners require can be drawn down in small parcels, but our preferred
method is based on drawing an annuity, as it is secure and unvarying until death. The product
bears similarity with viager products that have been available in the continent of Europe for some
time. For example, the viager intermédié partiel, a new product offered in France, enables assets
to be drawn down for paying for extra needs in old age or the gifting of liquid assets to
children.19
The equity bank fulﬁls several aims, but like the viager product its main purpose would be
to improve living standards in retirement, as well as making more money available for
everyday tasks such as care services, home maintenance and respite holidays, etc. It is
aimed at a sizeable group of older homeowners who have relatively small incomes of, say,
18 Mayhew (2009).
19 See, for example, André Masson (2012).
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£10,000 per annum or less, consisting mainly of the state pension and limited additional sources.
A stereotypical user could be, for example, a recently widowed woman living alone aged around
75 years who is eligible for means-tested beneﬁts such as Pension Credit or Council Tax
Beneﬁt,20 in other words, not a typical purchaser of existing equity-release products.
The effect of stipulating an older start age means that lifetime costs are lower and the money
is more likely to be spent on care, that is, it is more targeted. The reason why an annuity is
preferred over drawdown is that the equity may run out and that borrowing costs should be
lower because of scale effects (i.e. because the market would be larger). With an annuity it is
also arguably easier to budget for an older person and less complicated to administer;
additionally, the income would also be available and guaranteed right up to death.
The basic idea is that an individual sells a portion of their home to the state or its agent in
return for a guaranteed lifetime income while remaining in their own homes. On death, the
property would be sold, the debt to the state paid and any remaining value passed to the
person’s estate. In some respects it resembles the government’s student loan scheme, which
is designed to help pay for tuition fees and living costs.
Note that this differs from the government’s existing universal deferred-payment system
that allows eligible individuals that have moved into a care home to delay selling their homes
until a later date or upon death. Meanwhile, the local authority pays the care home fees with
the debt to the local authority repaid, including any interest, upon sale of the home.
We have already suggested that the target population is likely to include people who are
asset rich and income poor. However, within this broad deﬁnition there are different ways of
deﬁning members of this group. A more precise deﬁnition is provided by Figure 3, which is a
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Figure 3. Contour map showing the distribution of income and wealth. The highlighted area, A, comprises an
estimated 2.6 million individuals with assets of greater than £100,000 but incomes of less than £15,000.
20 Pension Credit provides additional state-funded retirement income for people on low incomes. Council tax is a
tax levied on households by local councils based on the estimated value of a property and the number of people
living in it. Council Tax Beneﬁt (now renamed the Council Tax Reduction Scheme) provides ﬁnancial relief to
people on low incomes.
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contour map of assets vs income in the 65+ population (source: ELSA).21 By age 65, most
will have retired and so their income in retirement will generally be lower compared with
when they were in work.
It can be seen that annual incomes tend to be concentrated in the range of £7k to £20k, a
proportion of which is made up of the state pension, which almost all pensioners receive, and
any occupational pension entitlement or other sources. The distribution of asset values shows
a completely different pattern, ranging from nothing to very substantial amounts. Two
concentrations of contours are observed—one very dense near the x-axis at income levels of
around £11,000 and another, just above, based on similar income but more diffuse.
The feature distinguishing these groups is that the more diffuse group are homeowners and
the other group concentrated near the x-axis are not. Now consider the region of the chart
covered by A; these are people with incomes of less than £15,000 but assets worth more than
£100,000. We term this group as “asset rich and income poor”. They comprise about
2.6 million individuals of whom 1.4 million are aged 65–74 and 1.2 million are aged 75+.
Of those aged 75+, around 400,000 are estimated to live alone. This is our target group
because: (a) they have equity to release; (b) their income is low and hence (c) they stand to
beneﬁt the most; and (d) payback periods would be shorter.
How the equity bank works in practice
With any annuity product, a lump sum is paid in advance, and the policyholder receives an
income until they die. In contrast, through the equity bank, the income is received ﬁrst and
the payment is made following the user’s death. The debt value is expressed as a percentage
of the home value and is recovered from the person’s estate. As the income is provided
upfront, we need to assume that money must be borrowed initially by the provider, which
will be recouped when the house is sold.
Therefore, the cost to the user would ultimately depend on government borrowing costs,
the costs of administration, and consequential changes in taxes and beneﬁts. Theoretically,
administration of the scheme could also be integrated into the welfare beneﬁts system,
where recoverable loan arrangements already exist, albeit for smaller amounts. Alternatively,
it could be a role that falls to local councils as they assume new duties under the Care Act.
There are possible variants in how the income amounts are calculated, but we assume that the
government would want them to retain their purchasing power and so payments would be
linked to price inﬂation (see Appendix B).
To reduce the number of variants, we use real rates of return, that is, we focus on the
difference between the rates of return and price inﬂation and, for simplicity, assume that
house price inﬂation is the same as price inﬂation. If house price inﬂation is assumed to
be higher than the price inﬂation (as has historically been the case), the costs of providing
the income in terms of percentage of equity will fall. Though the results are not quite
identical, a real interest rate of 1 per cent could be used if price inﬂation is assumed to be
2 per cent and investment return is 3 per cent, or if price inﬂation is assumed to be 5 per
cent and investment return is 6 per cent and so on.
The easiest way to demonstrate how the equity bank would work is by way of an example
in which we illustrate the costs of a loan and how long it would take for the state to recoup its
21 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, www.elsa-project.ac.uk/, accessed 5 January 2016.
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investment on the basis of cash ﬂows. The model is based on ONS provisional life tables
for 2010–2012 and so is representative of “average lives” who will be a mix of people in
different initial states of health, some healthy and some less so. The cash-ﬂow consequences
on government expenditure are then shown for different cohorts (for simplicity 1,000
individuals are assumed) on an actuarially fair basis assuming no proﬁt margin.
From this we are able to estimate the impact on public expenditure, including outﬂows and
inﬂows, and the number of years it would take for the scheme to balance inﬂows and outﬂows.
We base the following examples on females because they are more likely to be the sole survivor
in cohabiting circumstances where equity is shared. Similar calculations are obviously possible
for males but, because males currently live for fewer years than do females, cash ﬂows will tend
to break even sooner. Table 3 (a)–(c) illustrates the cost of providing the income (i.e. the
original amount of equity that would need to be released at different ages).
Three price inﬂation-linked options are considered providing an initial income of £2,000,
£3,000 and £5,000 a year, respectively. For example, Table 3 shows that a woman aged 75
years would need to release £29,500 worth of equity to generate an income for life of £2,000
(interest assumed at 2 per cent per annum). A younger woman aged 65, with a longer life
expectancy, would need to release £50,400 at the same interest rate.
It is seen that the cost of providing the income increases signiﬁcantly at higher interest rates,
which is a reﬂection of the cost of borrowing for the equity bank to fund the scheme. For
example, the £5,000 a year income in Table 3(c) where real interest rates are 5 per cent for a 65-
year old will cost £159,300 as compared with £116,000 at an interest rate of 1 per cent.
This may initially appear to be a counter-intuitive result, as, when the real interest
rate increases, it costs more to get the same yearly income. Normally with annuities, the
policyholder gets a higher income when interest rates are high, but for this policy, as the
payment is made at the end of the income stream, it is more valuable the lower the discount
rate and hence, less home equity needs to be ceded.
Table 3 Capital cost in £000s of a price inﬂation-linked annuity based on different start ages and
borrowing rates for income levels of: (a) £2,000 p.a.; (b) £3,000 p.a.; (c) £5,000 p.a.
Age 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
(a) £2,000 p.a.
60 56.9 63.2 70.0 77.4 85.3
65 46.4 50.4 54.6 59.1 63.7
70 36.7 39.1 41.6 44.1 46.7
75 28.2 29.5 30.8 32.1 33.4
(b) £3,000 p.a.
60 85.4 94.9 105.1 116.1 127.9
65 69.6 75.6 82.0 88.6 95.6
70 55.1 58.7 62.4 66.1 70.0
75 42.3 44.2 46.1 48.1 50.0
(c) £5,000 p.a.
60 142.4 158.1 175.2 193.6 213.1
65 116.0 126.0 136.6 147.7 159.3
70 91.9 97.8 104 110.2 116.6
75 70.5 73.7 76.9 80.2 83.4
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In the introduction to this article, we noted that the average equity owned by an older
homeowner was £122k, and in the cases where the partner was deceased, the average could
therefore be twice this amount. Assuming that an individual living alone is prepared to give
up half the equity in the home and that real interest rates are, say 2 per cent, then, a person
releasing equity valued at £122k would receive an annual income of £3,860 (age 60), £4,840
(age 65), £6,250 (age 70) and £8,275 (age 75).
From the above we can see that the up-front costs of the scheme to the state are higher at
younger ages, because people live longer until the loan is recouped, and, in addition, the
volumes of participants will be potentially greater. This suggests that the scheme should be
introduced ﬁrst at older ages before being broadened to younger ages once the scheme is
established.
Figure 4 shows the predicted cash ﬂow out of and into the equity bank on the basis of a
caseload of 1,000 women aged 75 years and a start year of 2015. For an income worth
initially £2,000 p.a. to each woman participating, the initial outlay is £2m, reducing to almost
zero by 2040 as the remaining survivors reach the age of 100 years. As can be seen, inﬂows
on the sale of equity build up gradually and exceed outﬂow in 2024 (point P) before peaking
in 2030.
Cash ﬂow is important, as it affects broader public expenditure choices, especially if it is
introduced on a large scale with many more participants than is assumed in the example
shown. Table 4 shows the break-even year (inﬂows equal outﬂows) based on the same start
year as of 2015.
P
Figure 4. Chart showing cash ﬂows for 1,000 women aged 75 in 2015 based on £2,000 annuity at 2 per cent p.a.
Table 4 Break-even year in cash ﬂow terms by age based on providing an initial income of £2,000 p.a.,
and an interest rate of 2% p.a.
Age Loan ('000 £) Break-even year
60 63.2 2033
65 50.4 2030
70 39.1 2027
75 29.5 2024
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It is seen that the time is extended for younger ages because loan costs are greater and
the time of death is later. Hence, there is a later switch between paying out income and
recouping costs. Repayments start shortly after each person dies, and there would need to be
arrangements in place to compensate people dying in the early years of taking out a plan, as
there are for standard annuity products.
From a public expenditure standpoint, we conclude that the older the person the quicker
the scheme will generate positive cash ﬂows. For these reasons, we suggest an initial start
age of 75 years, but this could be extended to younger ages as experience is gained and as
public ﬁnances allow in the light of trends in life expectancy and the housing market.
The scheme would be rolled out in the light of actual receipts and trends in future
life expectancy. Calculations based on the same assumptions as in Figure 4 and assuming
40,000 new applicants a year, each with an annual starting income of £2,000, show a build-
up in expenditure to a maximum of around £300m per annum after nine years and falling
thereafter.
To repeat, the above illustrations apply only to people living alone. In cohabiting
households, extra conditions may be needed to avoid loan periods becoming overextended
or the cost of loans adjusted accordingly, depending on factors such as the age difference and
gender of each partner in the cohabiting case. Different calculations are needed for these
cases and are not considered here.
The equity bank is likely to be more popular in some areas of the country than in others,
and its local impact is obviously dependent on the number of people ﬁtting the preferred
proﬁle. This could be an argument for schemes to be based within local authorities as
previously suggested.
A case study based on six London municipalities (boroughs) in 2011 found that, of the
118,000 people aged 65+, an estimated 75,000 were homeowners, and, of these, 36 per cent
lived in households on means-tested beneﬁts (our measure of low income). Of these, 4,900
were aged 75+ and lived in higher tax banded properties amounting to 4.1 per cent of the
older population.
Given our suggestion that the scheme would initially include only people turning 75 years
old each year, the numbers are correspondingly much smaller. Of the 5,800 people that
turned 75 in 2011, 717 lived alone in privately owned accommodation and of these, 311
were income poor. If all 311 took out an annuity worth £2,000, the cost in the ﬁrst year
would only be around £622,000.
Nationally, if we restrict the market to those turning 75 each year, the potential market would
be around 40,000 policies. The annual cost of the scheme would therefore depend on how many
of these chose to join the scheme. The ﬁgure of 40,000 may be compared with the current market
for equity release, which is currently running at around 20,000 new plans a year.
Tax and welfare beneﬁt implications
All sums realised by any form of equity release are considered under rules for claiming
welfare beneﬁts as being capital or income. The use of our insurance-based product does not
have any immediate tax or beneﬁt consequences as far as we can tell and is not pursued
further here. Sufﬁce it to say that, by buying such a policy, an individual would not have
Les Mayhew et al.
Using Housing Wealth to Pay for Care Costs
143
access to means-tested ﬁnancial support, because their care costs would be covered by the
policy.
It is arguable that the government could provide ﬁnancial incentives through the tax
system to encourage people to purchase this kind of policy and several options are possible.
In our case, our preferred scheme is designed to produce a regular income and so taxation
rules for treatment of capital would not apply. This would be the case if a person opted, say,
for an equity drawdown product, especially where the amounts drawn down put them above
the capital limit for, say, pension credit purposes.
In contrast, a person using equity to generate an income may be liable to pay income tax
and/or receive reduced amounts of means-tested state beneﬁts, depending on their level of
income and wealth. Currently, income tax does not apply to equity-drawdown products as
long as it is from a person’s main home. Clearly, the differing treatment under income tax
rules could undermine the attractiveness of our proposal and therefore any social value.
The possible movements in income and tax revenues are captured in Figure 5. A ﬁxed
amount of equity is transferred to the state in exchange for a regular income. There are two
accompanying ﬂows: one is additional income tax to the Exchequer that is potentially due on
any additional income; and the second is a reduction in income-related beneﬁts ﬂowing from
the state to the individual.
For the average pensioner, the marginal rate of tax on additional income is 20 per cent
for income over the personal allowance. However, income-related beneﬁts such as
pension credit and council tax beneﬁt are also withdrawn as income increases, the
pension credit at a higher withdrawal rate than the council tax beneﬁt. A higher income
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Figure 5. Chart showing money ﬂows in the system (Key: £E is value of home, £A is the equity released; £B is
the residual value of the estate). Actual ﬂows will depend on tax beneﬁts rules.
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could also result in the loss of certain health beneﬁts such as help with dental costs or
other beneﬁts in kind.
Conversely, certain welfare beneﬁts such as the disability living allowance, attendance
allowance or winter fuel payments are not means-tested or subject to tax and so the problem
appears to be limited to only a few beneﬁts. Because our target group are over pension age,
any interactions with working age beneﬁts are thus avoided. Overall, the picture is therefore
not as complicated as it might ﬁrst appear and could potentially be addressed relatively
simply.
Consider an average case of an older person living alone with modest savings. Two basic
situations can be identiﬁed as follows:
(a) People with incomes below £10,000 do not pay income tax, but receive pension credit
and help with council tax.
(b) People with taxable income over £10,000 pay income tax, do not receive pension credit
and only reduced levels of help with council tax up to incomes of around £14,000.
Suppose a person decides to release equity from their home. In case (a), the ﬁnancial
beneﬁt would be marginal, as most of the available extra income would be offset not by tax
but by the withdrawal of pension credit and council tax beneﬁt. In case (b), a person would
be unaffected by the withdrawal of pension credit and only partly affected by council tax
beneﬁt; however, they would be affected by higher taxes due on the annuity.
Thus, a person whose income is £10,000 initially who uses her home to generate an
additional income of £3,000 a year would only be around £2,000 a year better off after tax
and withdrawal of council tax support. A ﬁnancial advisor may conclude therefore that
capital drawdown is the better option than an annuity, especially if taken in small lump sums.
Such tax inconsistencies suggest that if the government wishes to proceed with the scheme,
tax rules will require alteration in favour of equal tax treatment.
The most obvious option would be to disregard income from released housing equity as
long as the equity is released from their main home. This would put it on a par with
drawdown products, which, as noted, are also not counted as income for tax purposes.
Because of the high withdrawal rate of Pension Credit it also makes sense to disregard
equity-based income for the purposes of its calculation. The impact of withdrawal of Council
Tax Beneﬁt, however, is much less consequential, and there are already deductions for
people living alone or are registered disabled. Clearly, further work is needed to verify and
cost these suggestions.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to show that a considerable part of personal wealth in the UK is
contained in housing assets, which have increased substantially in value in recent decades.
Some of this group will choose to release equity through downsizing, though a majority
would prefer not to have to move home because of the costs and for other reasons. We have
argued that housing wealth is a decisive factor in determining how many years of care people
are likely to be able to afford if they were able to release equity on the right terms.
After the most signiﬁcant reforms to social care funding in living memory, there is a
temptation for policymakers to believe that the mission to reform the care funding system has
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been accomplished. As the provisions in the Care and Support Bill are now law, many hope
that this will create the conditions for a new market in long-term care products to ﬂourish.
However, the recently announced four-year delay to the introduction of a care cap due to the
complexities of its introduction is unhelpful, as it is bound to affect the introduction of any
product that requires proof of expenditure up to the cap.
This is not the case for either of the products set out in this article, as, arguably, they
present opportunities both for the private sector and for the state. The inclusion of a cap on
care costs is not strictly necessary for either of the ﬁnancial products we have outlined, but it
would make them cheaper to provide if it had the effect of lowering the premium on the
equity-for-insurance product and substituted for some of the eligible care costs paid for by
the equity bank. This would depend on what are counted as eligible care costs and how long
it would take for them to accrue to the cap.
The equity-for-insurance policy has the important advantage that the premiums do not
have to be paid out of current income, thus removing one of the key barriers to the take-up of
long-term care insurance. Like all insurance products it means that if care is never needed,
the premium will have been wasted. However, it is a relatively cheap way of protecting one’s
assets and should give people the peace of mind they seek without eating into their current
standard of living. Their heirs should be happier at the prospect of not seeing their
inheritance disappearing on care home fees and so should support inter-generational
bonding.
The “equity bank”, however, should allow users to have a more comfortable retirement and
fewer ﬁnancial worries and enable them to stay in their own homes for longer. Assuming that the
income is inﬂation-protected (either linked to inﬂation or house prices (though this could lead to
a more volatile income)), the improvement will be durable. Individuals normally trust
government ﬁnancial institutions more than commercial ﬁrms and so should enjoy greater peace
of mind, especially if the government acts as guarantor as it does, up to a point, with bank and
savings deposits and occupational pensions. There is a risk that house prices will fall once the
baby boomers have died out, but we do not believe this is realistic for the simple reason that the
population is projected to grow rapidly and with it, housing demand.
A consequence of both products is that individuals will pass on less to their heirs.
However, unless the whole value of the home is used, users will still beneﬁt from rising
house prices. In the U.K., inheritance tax (IHT) is payable on assets once they pass a certain
threshold—for individuals this is currently £325k, with 40 per cent tax due on amounts over
this value. Both products should reduce liability for inheritance tax in cases where the estate
is worth more than the personal threshold, so there would be a reduction in tax revenues from
this source, all other things being equal. In practice, people with signiﬁcant assets undertake
estate planning anyway in order to reduce IHT liabilities over time by, for example, gifting
money to their children or relatives (i.e. giving it with no strings attached) and through other
means such as family trusts. The effect of our products on estate planning is therefore hard to
anticipate but may actually be neutral.
For government policymakers, both products should help to relieve potential poverty in
this vulnerable group and thereby lead to improved quality of life as well as enable people to
stay in their homes for longer if they wish to. It will help make a contribution to care costs
when and if they are required, and help moderate growth in state-funded social care. If house
prices go up, this could be an additional source of proﬁt for government (but only if a
percentage of the home and not a ﬁxed sum is transferred into state ownership). If a person
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dies early, there could be pressure on compensation to heirs (but again, not the other way
around). The scheme could be designed to avoid large ﬁnancial loss, but this would mean
generating less income.
Whether the equity bank would have an impact on the existing equity-release industry is
debatable and would depend on the details of the scheme. If equity release becomes more
popular as a result of its introduction, commercial providers might receive more business from
those outside the qualifying criteria as the equity release gains more market traction. The Equity
Release Council agrees with us that there is a huge potential market in this area waiting to be
unlocked.22 The government may also decide to franchise the product, in which case,
commercial providers could compete with, as well as against, the equity bank. They would be
up against a new competitor that can borrow money cheaper, has a different pricing mechanism
and has a better “brand” of trust, so sales will be harder. The extra income generated could also
beneﬁt local economies especially in towns where older people tend to congregate.
Administrative costs of either scheme have not been analysed in detail. We anticipate that
these would beneﬁt from signiﬁcant economies of scale, which is an argument both for state
involvement, especially in regard to the recovery of money from sale of homes after death,
and for large insurers to play a major role. In fact, these tasks could be outsourced to
government or private agencies. There would need to be some streamlining of information
systems to ensure that estates could be settled quickly with equity creditors taking
precedence over assets to be disbursed. Safeguards would be needed to ensure that
policyholders did not build up other signiﬁcant debts in the meantime.
On a ﬁnal note, we believe it is important to come up with new ideas that deliver extra
resources and wider social beneﬁts, given the demographic and ﬁnancial pressures. This
article has been designed to facilitate new ways of doing this using equity release, but we
should also end on a note of caution. A gap in our proposals is for those who do not own
property wealth, and this needs further examination, as the incentives for this group to save
are generally much lower. A related proposal for these groups is set out, for example, in
Mayhew et al.23 and Mayhew and Smith;24 overall, however, the government and insurers
need to apply more energy and greater imagination if these or similar ideas are to take off.
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Appendix A
Calculating the value of the insurance premium
As an insurance product, we are paying a premium now that will pay for a claim in the future.
Normally, with insurance, we consider the premiums to be invested in assets that generate an
investment return that we can use to discount the beneﬁts to get a present value. In this case,
the premium is invested in the person’s home, and the rate of return achieved is house
inﬂation. At the same time, the costs of care are escalating and so, the net investment return is
the difference between house price inﬂation and the cost of care, approximated here by
general price inﬂation.
Deﬁne:
x as age
Pinf as annual price inﬂation
Hinf as annual house inﬂation
Annc as the current annual cost of care
n as the number of years in care before death
perc as the percentage of people who will need
care
lx as the number of lives aged x in a stable
population made up of the mortality rates of
the population
lx
s as the number of lives aged x in a stable
population in care made up of the mortality
rates of the population
Calculation of beneﬁts
We assume that nobody needs care before they get to the age of 65 years.
The number of people entering care in our population aged r is thus:
lsr ¼ perc ´ lr + n; where r≥ 65 + n:
And, if we assume that our life is currently aged x, the cost of a year of care when they ﬁrst
enter is:
Annc ´ 1 +P infð Þr - x:
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Then the total cost of care at age r discounted by the difference in house price and care
inﬂation is:
Carer ¼ Annc ´
1
1 + i
 r - x
´
1 - ð1=ð1 + iÞÞn
i
 
where i ¼
1 +Hinf
1 +Pinf
- 1:
The total beneﬁt for someone currently aged x is therefore:
Ben ¼
1
lx
X120
r¼x
Carer ´ l
s
r:
Premium
The premium is allocated at the start of the period, and hence as a nominal payment it is the
same as the beneﬁts, that is,
Premium ¼ Ben:
And we then can express this as a percentage of the home equity as:
Equity used ¼
Premium
Current Value of Home
:
Appendix B
Calculating the value of an annuity
The concept of an “equity bank” can be seen as a form of an annuity. With an annuity
product there is a sum paid in advance, and the policyholder receives income until they die.
With our proposed product the income is received ﬁrst and the payment is made following
the purchaser’s death. In monetary terms the amount that will be paid is unknown, although
it is known in terms of house prices.
We assume that the income received is linked to price inﬂation.
Deﬁne:
x as age
Pinf as annual price inﬂation
Hinf as annual house inﬂation
i is interest rate required
lx as the number of lives aged x in a stable
population made up of the mortality rates of
the population
Inc as the amount of income received in the ﬁrst
year
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Beneﬁt received
Assume that income is received at the start of the year.
The ﬁrst payment hence is Inc.
The second payment is Inc×(1+Pinf) assuming that the person is still alive.
The third payment is Inc×(1+Pinf)2, etc.
The probability that someone aged x at the start is alive in t years is lx+t /lx
The present value of the income stream is therefore:
Inc 1 +
lx + 1
lx
1 +Pinf
1 + i
 
+
lx + 2
lx
1 +Pinf
1 + i
 2
+
lx + 3
lx
1 +Pinf
1 + i
 3
+   
" #
In standard actuarial notation this can be written as:
Inc ´ €ax with interest rate¼
1 + i
1 +Pinf
 
- 1:
Payment
We assume that, as the person is giving up the appreciation in their home value for the part
that has been used for equity release, the later the payment is made the greater the value of
the home (assuming that house price inﬂation is positive over the duration). Assuming that
the monetary value of the home given up at the start of the contract is X and that the value is
taken at the end of the year of death, the value of the payment is as follows:
X
lx + 1 - lx
lx
1 +Hinf
1 + i
 
+
lx + 2 - lx + 1
lx
1 +Hinf
1 + i
 2
+
lx + 3 - lx + 2
lx
1 +Hinf
1 + i
 3
+   
" #
In standard actuarial notation this can be written as:
X ´Ax with interest rate ¼
1 + i
1 +Hinf
 
- 1:
The cost of the arrangement
To determine X, we need to calculate:
X ¼
Inc ´ €ax
Ax
:
This can then be expressed as a percentage of current home value.
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